(Answered) McDonald’s (MD) and Hungry Jack’s (HJ) are contemplating opening a restaurant in West End. After…

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McDonald’s (MD) and Hungry Jack’s (HJ) are contemplating opening a restaurant in West End. After doing some market research, MD found it would realize a monopoly profit of 10 if it had the only restaurant in the market, while HJ found it would realize a monopoly profit of 8 if it had the only restaurant in the market. If a firm does not enter the market, then it realizes a profit of 0. If MD and HJ both enter the market, they have two possible (discrete) pricing choices: charge high prices PH and low prices PL. If they both choose PH, then they each earn profits of 6. If they both choose PL, then they each earn profits of 3. If one firm charges PH and the other chooses PL, then the firm charging PH earns a profit of 2 and the firm charging PL earns a profit of 7. Assume that MD and HJ set their prices simultaneously in the case that they have both entered the market.
(1) Consider first the pricing game assuming (for the moment) that both MD and HJ have entered the market. Write down the game table/normal form for this simultaneous pricing game. Find the outcome of this game.
(2) Now consider a two-period entry game. In the first period MD and HJ simultaneously choose to either enter the market (ENTER) or not enter the market (NOT ENTER). Upon seeing the period one entry decisions of both firms, in period two MD and HJ simultaneously choose their prices if they are both in the market. If a firm is the sole entrant, it simply earns its monopoly profit. If a firm does not enter the market, it earns a profit of 0. Find the equilibrium outcome of this game.
(3) Suppose now that if a firm does not enter the market then it realizes a profit of 4 (say from investing the money that it would have otherwise spent on opening a restaurant). Find the outcome of this game.

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