Lucy (L) and Kitty (K) are two lumberjacks working in the forest near Paradise Pond and the Mill River. Each player has a fallback position of a payoff of 12. The interaction between the two lumberjacks works as follows. Lucy and Kitty may choose between chopping wood for 12 hours and chopping wood for 6 hours. Their actions and preferences provide a normal form game as represented by the following Tabletable[[,Kitty],[,Chop 6 hours,Chop 12 hours],[,Chop 6 hours,51,51],[Lucy,66,24,12,12],[,Chop 12 hours,66],[,,]]i.
Does either player have a strictly dominant strategy in the Game? Is there a dominant strategy equilibrium? Explain.[3 points]
What are the players’ best responses in the Game? Show all the steps.[2 points]
What is/are the Nash equilibrium/ equilibria of the game? Explain.[3 points]
Define Pareto-efficiency. What are the shortcomings of Pareto efficiency
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