equilibnum.3.
Consider a credit market where two profit-maximizing lenders compete with each other. Each borrower has a project which requires 1 unit of capital from the lender. The project if successful yields Y>0 and 0 if fails. There are two types of borrowers in the market—safe borrowers with probability of success pS and risky borrowers with probability of failure pR with pS>pR. The lenders offer contracts with two components—a gross repayment amount R and a collateral C that a borrower has to deposit for getting a loan. In case of a failure, the collateral can be liquidated by the lender.
The borrower’s pay-off is Y-R if the project is successful and – C if the project fills. The lender’s pay-offs in these states, R-1 and C respectively.
Suppose it is common knowledge that λ fraction of all borrowers is safe.
(a) Argue that in any subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, the lenders must earn zero profit for contracts offered to each type of borrowers.
(b) Show that a pooling equilibrium cannot exist in this market.
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