Question 3.
A seller S owns a single indivisible good. There is one potential buyer B. The seller’s utility if he sells the good and receives a transfer payment tS is equal to tS. If he does not sell the good and receives a transfer tS then his utility is θS + tS, where θS is a random variable with cumulative distribution function FS and density fS. We assume that FS has support θ(S), bar (θ)S and that fS(θS) > 0 for all θS in [θ(S), bar (θ)S].
The buyer’s utility if he purchases the good and pays a transfer tB equals θB − tB, where θB is a random variable with cumulative distribution function FB and density fB. We assume that FB has support θ(B), bar (θ)B and that fB(θB) > 0 for all θB in [θ(B), bar (θ)B]. The buyer’s utility if he does not obtain the good and pays transfer tB is −tB.
The random variables θS and θB are independent. In addition, bar (θ)S > θB and θ(S) b = 0.
The designer seeks a mechanism which is (1) ex-ante budget-balanced, (2) interim individually rational and (3) Bayesian Incentive Compatible. Using the above result, write down the constraints and the implications of these requirements.
Hint:
While solving the exercise, watch out for the payoff function of the seller. In order to use the results obtained for the linear model during the lecture, it is useful to rewrite the seller’s payoff as −x θS − tilde(t)S, with tilde(t)S = −tS. This does not change the mechanism designer’s problem because we included an additively separable constant to the seller’s payoff function. But, doing so, one sees that the
Leave a Reply