(Answered) Mays and McCovey are beer producers that operate in a duopoly (two-firm oligopoly). The daily…

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Mays and McCovey are beer producers that operate in a duopoly (two-firm oligopoly). The daily marginal cost (MC) of producing a can of beer is constant and equals $0.60 per can. Also, assume that neither firm had any startup costs. That is, marginal cost equals average cost (AC) for each firm.
Suppose that Mays and McCovey form a cartel, and the firms divide the output evenly. (Note: This is only for convenience, since nothing in the model requires that the two companies must equally share the output.)
Place the black point (plus symbol) on the following graph to indicate the profit-maximizing price and combined quantity of output if Mays and McCovey choose to work together. Note: Drop lines will extend to both axes automatically. When they act as a profit-maximizing cartel, each company will produce 40 cans per day and charge $0.80 per can. Given this information, each firm earns a daily profit of $4, so the total industry profit in the beer market is $8 per day.
Suppose you analyze the previous situation using the Bertrand model. Which of the following are assumptions of this model? Check all that apply.
The goods are perfect substitutes.
Firms choose to produce quantities as best responses to the quantity the other firm produces.
All sales go to the firm with the lowest price.
Again using the Bertrand model, which of the following statements is true of the point representing the cartel price and quantity you found previously?
Either firm could increase its profits by decreasing the price it charges.
It is a Nash equilibrium.
Either firm could increase its profits by increasing the price it charges.

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