John wants to buy a certain type of used car. Paula owns this type of used car. Paula claims that her car is in excellent condition. She knows the real condition of her used car. Her car is not in good condition.John does not know automobile mechanics and thus does not know whether Paula’s car is in excellent condition.John is willing to buy a used car in good condition at $21,000 and a used car in less than good condition at $11,000.Paula makes an offer to John for $17,000. Since her car is in less-than-good condition, she would be willing to sell it to John or anybody else for $10,000.Assume the probability of buying a good car in the used car market is 50%, and, therefore, the probability of buying a bad car is 50%.
Is this situation an adverse selection problem or a moral hazard problem or both? Explain your answer. (15 points)
Will John accept Paula’s offer ( $17,000 )? Explain your answer. ( 25 points)
What is the maximum price at which John would buy Paula’s car? Explain your answer. ( 20 points)
Identify two ways to reduce the information asymmetry between John and Paula regarding the real condition of the car. Explain your answer. (15 points)
Leave a Reply