Question 2There are many anecdotes that during trench warfare in the first world war the Allied forces and the German soldiers (Central forces) left their trenches without being attacked by the enemy. There was, thus, a certain level of cooperation between the soldiers on the two sides of the battle field. This exercise illustrates how this could have come about in an infinitely repeated game. Recall the set-up of Chapter 14. Each side has available two options on what it can do, fight \( (f) \) or accommodate (a). Assume that the strategic form (sub)game is as follows:
If the battle lasts for only one period, describe this game as a normal form game and find the Nash equilibrium and the Nash equilibrium payoffs. Discuss your answer.
The two sides were able to cooperate. Assuming an infinite repetition of the stage game in which each side has a discount factor equal to \( \delta \) where \( 0<\delta<1 \) and using grim trigger strategies, determine the critical discount factor above which cooperation (= peace!) is sustainable.
How would you interpret the discount factor \( \delta \) in this setting?
Leave a Reply